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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STEWART MICHAEL KELSEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
Case No. 
13376 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the appellant Stewart 
Michael Kelsey of a conviction of second degree murder. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant Stewart Michael Kelsey was charged 
with murder in the first degree after the death of one 
Raymond Douglas Eagle. The Honorable Ernest F. Bald-
win found the appellant sane and competent to under-
stand the nature of the processes against him and to aid 
in his own defense. The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins 
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of the Third Judicial District sat without jury at the 
trial of the appellant and on April 18, 1973, found the 
appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. The 
appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
from ten years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks the affirmation of the trial 
court's finding that the appellant was guilty of murder 
in the second degree and an order refusing the appellant's 
request for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees basically with the facts pre-
sented in appellant's brief but adds the following to clar-
ify and add to what has been presented. 
(1) Mrs. Betty Herron testified that even though 
the police officers did not have a search warrant to look 
in the house, they asked her if they could do so (R. 187). 
Further, she stated that she wanted to be a law abiding 
citizen and therefore allowed them in even though she 
knew she could refuse to admit them (R. 187). At no 
time did she or anyone ask them to leave. 
The money paid Mrs. Herron by the appellant was 
for a pre-existing debt from a previous residence. The 
amount over and above the cost of the phone was $4 (R. 
418). 
(2) Dr. Dominic Albo, who performed surgery on 
Raymond Eagle testified that the laceration of the liver 
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came from a blunt trauma (R. 222) and required con-
siderable force for the liver to be injured in that man-
ner (R. 228). 
(3) Officer Jerry Campbell of the Salt Lake Police 
Department spoke with the defendant for the first time 
at approximately 10:35 p.m. on the evening of November 
27, 1972 (R. 263). At that time, no Miranda warning 
was given because it was not known the involvement and 
acts of the defendant (R. 263-266). After approximately 
30 minutes, the Miranda warning was given and a re-
porter took down his statement (R. 268). Nothing from 
the conversation between Officer Campbell and the de-
fendant which took place between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. 
was admitted into evidence at trial (R. 263-264). While 
enroute to the defendant's quarters, the defendant was 
once again told his rights (R. 270). The defendant helped 
locate items used in the beating and told the officer about 
the belt (R. 273). 
(4) Stewart Michael Kelsey, defendant in the case, 
admitted that his rights were given him three times that 
evening (R. 289) and that he knew at that time that 
anything he said would be used against him (R. 29). 
When asked whether he understood the rights he said 
yes (R. 293) and though he subsequently testified that 
he wanted an attorney, he in fact never requested one 
(R. 291). 
(5) Richard Shepard, Deputy County Attorney, 
testified that the defendant carried on a logical reason-
able conversation with him (R. 307). 
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(6) Doctor Moench testified that the defendant 
had a disorder whereby he had to gratify impulses (R. 
452) and that his ability, to control such was diminished 
(R. 452). The defendant was emotionally keyed up 
from an altercation with his stepfather which took place 
on a previous day (R. 454). He further testified that 
there was probably no intent to harm the child until after 
the event got underway (R. 455) and that the child's 
actions made the defendant lash out (R. 456). It was 
testified that the defendant knew right from wrong and 
knew the nature and consequences of his acts (R. 458), 
that it's not right to strike or make an injured child 
walk and to do so could kill the child (R. 458-459). The 
defendant was in the "normal" intelligence range (R. 
465). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WAIVE 
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
A. 
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH COUN-
SEL AND THE COURT THAT THE DEATH 
PENALTY WOULD NOT BE IMPOSED IN 
THE CASE MAKING THE WAIVER OF A 
JURY TRIAL PERMISSIBLE. 
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The appellant relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-
2 (1953), as the basis for this appeal. The pertinent 
language of the statute is as follows: 
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, 
but in all cases except where a sentence of 
death may be imposed, trial by jury may be 
waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall 
be made in open court and entered in the 
minutes." (Emphasis added.) 
A cursory reading of this language makes it appear 
that in every capital case, a trial by jury is an absolute 
which cannot be waived. This position is propounded 
at great length by the appellant in Argument I of his 
brief. The respondent contends, however, that the stan-
dard so claimed is not "absolute," but hinges solely on 
the determination whether the death penalty "may be 
imposed." 
The appellant argues strenuously that a judge must 
impose a penalty of death in a first degree murder case 
once the verdict of guilty is brought in and that only 
the jury can request otherwise. This analysis has little 
or no bearing on the case at bar since appellant 
was found guilty of second degree murder rather than 
first degree and since the prior ruling of the court allow-
ing Kelsey to waive a jury (thereby impplying that no 
death penalty would be imposed) mitigated any possibil-
ity of prejudice to the defendant. 
State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P. 2d 495 
(1941), is cited by the appellant to indicate the differ-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ence between the jury's function and that of the court. 
It is an accepted standard, however, that the court de-
cides points of law and not the jury. Thus, since the 
United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), 
the status of Utah's death penalty has been in question. 
No express answer has yet been given as to its staitus in 
Utah. The respondent claims, however, that the totality 
of the Furman case need not be examined in the case 
at bar. What needs to be examined is the death pen-
alty's status as it relates to the present situation, 
In the case of State of Utah v. Christean and Rogers, 
No. 13510, Utah Supreme Court case pending before this 
Court and whose trial took place several weeks before 
the present case, Mr. Gilbert Athay was appointed as 
counsel in that case and trial was held in the Third Ju-
dicial District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
presiding. In the opening moments of that trial the 
court ruled as follows: 
" T H E COURT: Pursuant to the statute 
quoted by Mr. Athay the statute requires in 
this case that issues of fact must be tried by a 
jury, but in all cases, except where a sentence 
of death may be imposed, trial by jury may be 
waived by the defendant. . . . [the Supreme 
Court has said that statutes like ours, and I 
indulge, are not constitutional at this time. 
Therefore, I would have to hold that in no 
event in this case could the sentence of death 
be imposed. Therefore, you would have the 
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right, according to our statute, to waive a jury 
trial. What is your desire? Do you desire to 
waive your constitutional right?]" (Emphasis 
added) (T.7) 
Whether Judge Baldwin misconstrued the Furman 
case as it applies to Utah law is not paramount. What 
is important is the fact that Mr. Hill, a legal associate 
of Mr. Athay, relied on Judge Baldwin's ruling as did 
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins. This understanding 
of the court and counsel, though not made in open court 
as was done in the Christean case is what all parties 
relied on in the granting of the appellant's motion to 
waive the jury trial. As such, the findings of law before 
the trial commenced confirmed in the mind of counsel 
and the court that the death penalty would not be in-
voked and that a ruling became the "law of the case." 
See Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123, 257 P. 677 (1929), 
which discusses the concept of "law of the case." No 
exception was taken at the time of trial, and there is 
nothing to show that the court or counsel moved for such 
waiver in reckless disregard for what the outcome would 
be. Mr. Hill and Judge Wilkins were fully aware of the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2. Mr. Hill's knowl-
edge was particularly indicated by his discussion with 
Mr. Kelsey wherein they viewed the meaning of a jury 
trial and its waiver. 
There is no way that the appellant can claim he 
was prejudiced by such an understanding between the 
court and counsel. If anything, prejudice was against 
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the state. The "law of the case" was that the death 
penalty would not be applied even if the court found 
murder in the first degree. Furthermore, there was no 
prejudice in fact, since the court found the appellant 
guilty of a lesser crime — murder in the second degree 
which does not carry the penalty of death. 
Appellant cites State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 32, 512 
P. 2d 1031 (1973), and Roll v. Larsen, 30 Utah 2d 271, 
516 P. 2d 1392 (1973), in support of his position that a 
jury trial cannot be waived. Neither case is on point. 
A careful reading of James and Roll indicates that the 
court merely held that "capital" cases stall exist in Utah. 
The entire opinions center around discussions of "classi-
fication" theory of offenses and how that theory stands 
in light of Furman. Respondent concedes and agrees 
with the court's opinions in James and Roll that certain 
offenses are still capital in nature. The court said in 
James: 
"The Constitution of the State has pro-
vided a system of classifying certain serious 
offenses as capital cases and then mandated 
a specific procedural structure for the adminis-
tration of justice based on that classification. 
Furman v. Georgia cannot be rationally con-
strued as abrogating our fundamental law." 
The procedural structure referred to is that defen-
dants may waive a jury trial in all cases except where 
the death penalty may be applied. Therefore, in capital 
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cases where a death penalty may be a reality, one must 
be tried by a jury of twelve. In the present case, how-
ever, it was the "law of the case" that the death penalty 
could not be imposed, thus allowing a waiver of jury 
trial, which means a waiver of the twelve man jury as pre-
scribed by James. Thus, it must be concluded that capi-
tal offenses still exist, but that the waiver of the jury 
trial in the instant case was and is not governed by the 
James and Roll cases as asserted by the appellant. 
The respondent therefore submits that no prejudice 
exists which would demand the reversal for a new trial. 
The understanding of all parties involved made the possi-
bility of the death penalty a nullity and therefore the 
trial court's findings should be sustained. 
B. 
JURY TRIAL IS WAIVABLE BY DEFEN-
DANTS IN CAPITAL CASES AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND S T A T U T O R Y 
LANGUAGE IS NO BAR THERETO. 
Though a first reading of Utah constitutional and 
statutory provisions appears to indicate otherwise, there 
is strong reason to allow waiver of jury trials in those 
cases raised by the appellant. Absolute standards can 
be detrimental to those whom they are designed to pro-
tect. Flexibility must exist to prevent undue prejudice 
if the defendants in particular instances feel such would 
take place. 
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"Supposed fairness" is the argument used to estab-
lish the sanctity of a jury trial — especially in capital 
cases. This philosophy of fairness is deeply rooted in 
the common law. Such background led to Utah's enact-
ment of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 on which appellant's 
arguments are based. Basically, this protection was used 
to protect individuals from the tyrannny of the state. 
Today's "Due Process" procedures make available to an 
accused the protections upon which the jury trial system 
was based. The standards now insure that protections 
will be afforded and followed —the courts being the 
determiner of their effectiveness. The language empha-
sized by the appellant, is merely a verbal expression point-
ing out the importance of keeping the right to jury trial 
a reality. This simply means that such a right cannot 
be destroyed or ignored and that such a right shall always 
exist. 
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution says: 
"In capital cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate" (Emphasis added.) "Inviolate" has been de-
fined in jurisdictions such as Washington, State v. Furth, 
5 Wash. 2d 1, 104 P. 2d 925 (1940), to mean that the 
right cannot be "impaired" or "abridged" in any way, 
but must always exist. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 takes 
this language and attempts to make the standard abso-
lute. In other words, the statute attempts to make jury 
trials absolute in certain instances even though the con-
stitution does not go that far. The propriety of attempt-
ing to expand the constitutional language without con-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
stitutional amendment is clearly questionable. The con-
stitution merely provides that the right is absolute, but 
does not state that the application of that right is abso-
lute or that the right can never be waived. 
Respondent contends that many circumstances can 
arise where an accused charged with murder in the first 
degree would desire to waive a jury trial. The article 
"waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases," 25 Mich. 
Law Review 695 (1927), lists what could be considered 
a few of the reasons. The list contains the following: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
The charge is of a revolting nature. 
The entire state or community is aroused. 
The past record of the accused is bad. 
Public sentiment might influence jury. 
Great deal of publicity before trial. 
I t is a prosecution involving race. 
Judges greater experience can be valu-
able to the accused. 
Feeling that the jury will convict on 
general principles instead of evidence. 
Confidence in fairer trial by judiciary. 
Reluctance to go to trial on complicated 
issues. 
11) A desire to avoid the cumbersomeness 
and delay of a jury trial. 
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Certainly, these eleven reasons are not all inclusive, 
but they show that an absolute standard could work as 
a detriment in specific instances. It is obvious that in 
many cases it may be advantageous to have a trial by 
a judge without a jury — to deny such a choice might 
in itself deny the accused the right to a fair trial and 
make the jury an instrument of oppression rather than 
a means of "fair protection." 
The Ohio Supreme Court held many years ago in 
Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 120 N. E. 234 (1918), 
that: 
"Clearly this right [of jury trial] is for 
the benefit of the accused. If he regards it 
in the particular case as a burden, a hardship, 
a prejudice to fair trial, why in the name of 
reason should he not be permitted to waive it 
and submit his case to the magistrate.. . . What 
was given to him generally as a shield should 
not be used as a sword in case he feels that a 
jury trial in such a case would so result." 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that circum-
stances exist in which a jury trial may be waived without 
even trying the case to establish the facts. The court 
has openly acknowledged through its decisions that the 
plea of guilty, made in open court, takes the place of 
trial and verdict. Thus, if an accused in a first degree 
murder case enters a plea of guilty it is clear that he 
effectively waives jury trial even though the offense may 
be punishable by death. 
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In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383 
(1946), the Utah Supreme Court established that a plea 
of guilty dispenses with the jury because the plea is the 
same as if a jury had found the accused guilty. The court 
said: 
"He contends that the evidence shows that 
he pleaded guilty as a matter of convenience, 
and that a plea of guilty does not amount to 
a conviction. Such novel argument is specious. 
Unless timely withdrawan, a plea of guilty 
places a defendant in the same position as a 
verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the 
charge after a fair and impartial trial. A plea 
of guilty is a confession of the correctness of 
the accusation which dispenses with the neces-
sity of proof thereof." 
This holding was recently upheld in Coombs v. Turner, 
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 (1971), when the coua* 
said: 
"A plea of guilty dispenses with the neces-
sity of proof, and the issue of innocence or 
guilt cannot here be relitigated any more than 
it could be after a jury verdict of guilty." 
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 
253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), involved the interpretation of 
Art. I l l , Section 2, para. 3 of the United States Consti-
tution requiring jury trial in all criminal cases. In re-
jecting this absolute standard and language the Court 
stated: 
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"In the light of the foregoing it is reason-
able to conclude that the framers of the Consti-
tution simply were intent upon preserving the 
right of trial by jury primarily for the pro-
tection of the accused.... 
Upon this view of the constitution provi-
sions we conclude that article 3, § 2, is not 
jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right 
upon the accused which he may forego at his 
election. To deny his power to do so is to con-
vert a privilege into an imperative require-
ment. . . . 
After an extensive review of the authori-
ties and a discussion of the question on prin-
ciple, the court concluded that, since it was 
permissible for an accused person to plead 
guilty and thus waive any trial, he must neces-
sarily be able to waive a jury trial." 
See also, Mason v. United States, 250 F. 2d 704 (10th 
Cir. 1957). 
In light of the foregoing authority, it seems unreason-
able to permit an accused to dispense with every stage 
of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to dispense 
with a particular form of trial (trial by jury) by cootisent 
or waiver. These inconsistencies must give way to the 
better reasoned rule that the right to trial by jury — 
even in light of the statutory language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-2 is not absolute but must depend on cir-
cumstances in each particular case. Such a waiver is 
not contrary to sound conceptions of fairness or public 
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policy. If, for instance, the court holds that the death 
penalty will not apply in a particular case, then it is not 
error for the accused to waive the jury. 
The law permits venue to insure a fair trial, or to 
allow the accused the best position. Why then, if an 
individual honestly feels he would be judged more fairly 
by a judge sitting without a jury, should we force him 
to have his case heard by a jury? This type of force runs 
counter to Utah's as well as the United States' concep-
tion of justice. 
New York had no difficulty in realizing that this 
force should not be used. Article I, Section 2 of the New 
York Constitution is as explicit as Utah's statute and 
yet, the court allowed waiver. The pertinent language 
of the New York Constitution is as follows: 
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has 
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional 
provision shall remain inviolate forever * * *. 
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant 
in all criminal cases, except those in which the 
crime charged may be punishable by death, by 
a written instrument signed by the defendant 
in person in open court before and with the 
approval of a judge or justice of a court having 
jurisdiction to try the offense." 
This constitutional provision was interpreted by the New 
York Court in People v. Duchin, 12 N. Y. 2d 351, 190 
N. E. 2d 17 (1963), where an individual charged with 
rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, 
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carnal abuse of a child . . ., waived jury trial and later 
challenged that waiver on appeal. The court held that 
the jury trial may be waived in all cases despite the 
language of the constitution. The majority held that 
if an intelligent and knowing waiver is made, the jury 
may be waived. The court said: 
"The provision is designed for the benefit 
of the defendant. When, choosing to be tried 
by a judge alone, he requests a waiver, he is 
entitled to it as a matter of right once it appears 
to the satisfaction of the judge of the court 
having jurisdiction that, first, the waiver is 
tendered in good faith and is not a stratagem 
to procure an otherwise impermissible proced-
ural advantage— . . . —and, second, that the 
defendant is fully aware of the consequences 
of the choice he is making." 
Further, Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion contains the following language regarding jury trials: 
"And the legislature shall not make any 
law that shall subject any person to a capital 
or infamous punishment. . . . without trial by 
jury." 
In interpreting this language, the Massachusetts Court 
held in Commonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N. E. 537 (Mass., 
1926), that: 
"We find nothing in the words of our 
Constitution which declares or manifests an 
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intention to deprive the individual of power to 
refuse to assert his constitutional right to trial 
by jury." 
Thus, it can be clearly seen that there is support 
to the proposition that an individual can waive jury trial 
in capital offenses such as the one at bar. 
It is further established that nearly all rights granted 
by the United States Constitution may be waived. The 
only ones which appear to conflict with such a statement 
are "due process" or "equal protection" rights which 
themselves are made up of other waivable rights — such 
as trial by jury. 
The United States Supreme Court has accepted this 
philosophy and subsequently established it by holding 
that "knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional 
guarantees is only needed for those guarantees affecting 
due process." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 
93 S. Ct. 2041, 361 F. 2d 854 (1973). The court recog-
nizes that it is wrong to force rights upon an individual 
if he does not want their protection. Rights are afforded 
individuals to insure protections. If such protections are 
not wanted, not needed, or possible detriments to an 
accused, he should have the unalterable right to say "I 
don't want that right." 
The following are some of the rights which have been 
held to be waivable. (1) Right to a jury trial in criminal 
cases. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 
253 (1930). (2) Right against self-incrimination. Schmer-
ber v. State of California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 
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16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). (3) Right to confront witnesses. 
Illinois v. Alien, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ok 1057, 25 L. Ed. 
353 (1970). (4) Right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Mingo, 
407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ck 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). 
(5) Right to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 
25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). (6) Search 
and Seizure protections. Katz v. United States, 389 U. 
S. 347, 88 S. Ck 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). (7) Grand 
Jury indictment. Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 
79 S. Ck 991, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959). 
These few cases are, of course, only a representative 
sample of the many waivable rights. An individual of 
normal competence and intelligence should have some 
power over determining his future. He had that right 
when the crimes were committed. He should also have 
that right in relation to the consequences thereto. 
It is therefore submitted that public policy supports 
the view that an accused should be permitted to waive 
his right to jury trial. 
POINT II. 
A P P E L L A N T SHOULD NOT BE PER-
MITTED TO CLAIM REVERSIBLE ERROR 
(IF ERROR THERE WAS) SINCE SUCH 
ERROR WAS INDUCED BY THE APPEL-
LANT AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions, limits 
the rights of appellants in what can and cannot be ap-
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pealable errors. Such situations come into existence where 
defendants pled error to some facet of a trial where they 
induced the court into error or acquiesced to the decision 
made. This "after-the-fact" argument is exactly what 
appellant Kelsey is doing on this appeal. Simply stated, 
he is attempting to better his chances by claiming error 
to the ruling of the court which he asked the court to 
make. This "afterthought" approach claims "prejudice" 
when in fact no such prejudice existed. 
Appellant was charged with murder in the first de-
gree but was not found guilty of that offense. He was 
found guilty of murder in the second degree — a lesser 
offense — and received a lighter sentence than if he had 
been convicted of the capital offense. Appellant claims 
this is "prejudice." Respondent cannot understand how 
this conclusion is reached. It is not prejudicial for an 
accused to get a lighter sentence, when, as in this case, 
the evidence is arguably strong enough to convince a 
jury that premediated murder took place and that appel-
lant was guilty of that greater offense. Respondent urges 
the court to recognize this non-prejudicial decision of the 
court not that claimed by appellant. 
A leading case of the United States Supreme Court 
in this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 18, 63 
S. Ct. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943), held that the practice 
of claiming error on appeal from self-induced requests 
at trial cannot be sustained. The Court said: 
"We cannot permit an accused to elect 
to pursue one course at the trial and then, when 
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that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist 
on appeal that the course which he rejected 
at the trial be reopened to him. However un-
wise the first choice may have been, the range 
of waiver is wide. Since the protection which 
could have been obtained was plainly waived, 
the accused cannot now be heard to charge 
the court with depriving him of a fair trial. 
The court only followed the course which he 
himself helped to chart and in which he ac-
quiesced until the case was argued on appeal. 
The fact that the objection did not appear in 
the motion for new trial or in the arguments 
of error makes clear that the point now is a 
'mere afterthought., " 
If a party adheres to a particular mode of strategy 
in open court and either misleads or joints in any error 
induced by his strategy, and does not raise or claim such 
error at this time, he should not be permitted to com-
plain of unfairness by repudiating the course of trial he 
originally called for. Justice is not a system made up 
of accepted standards where parties can go back on their 
word — if you lose, repudiate your motions, agreements, 
and acts — but one where procedures are established to 
allow the orderly objection and handling of errors which 
do take place. (See also People v. Pijal, 33 Cal. App. 2d 
682, 109 Cal. Rpfcr. 230 (1973)). 
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil, the 
Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the posi-
tion referred to above. In State v. Aiken, 87 Utah 507, 
51 P. 2d 1052 (1935) the Court said: 
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"We think the rule applicable that a party 
cannot successfully assign as error a ruling 
which he himself induced the court to make." 
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the 
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P. 2d 107 
(1972), where the defendant' s counsel chose to examine 
a witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed 
on appeal that it was prejudicial error for the judge to 
have granted such motion. The court made it clear that 
the error complained of was self-induced and that it 
would not be permitted to stand on appeal. The court 
said: 
"Counsel chose not to do so, whether as 
a matter of strategy or otherwise—and it does 
not lie in the mouth of defendant now to claim 
error having either wittingly or unwittingly 
invited it." 
In the present situation, it is not totally clear why 
appellant Kelsey wanted a trial without a jury. Discus-
sions pertaining thereto are off the record and are guarded 
by the attorney-client privilege. But, whether the ap-
pellant's separate counsel convinced him "wittingly or 
unwittingly" to move for such waiver is now of no con-
cern. The fact is such motion was made, the judge was 
forced to rule, he did so, and the appellant accepted the 
ruling because it was what he desired. The appellant 
should not be allowed to now claim, as be looks back 
over his conviction, that prejudicial error of any magni-
tude took place. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on this issue 
on many other occasions. Many of them, however, con-
cerned themselves with civil cases which do not have the 
same gravity of effect. The respondent submits, however, 
that the principles and law laid down in those cases 
aPPly just as well to the case at bar as to the situations 
under which the holdings were rendered. Ludlow v. Colo-
rado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 
347 (1943), held: 
"A party who takes a position which 
either leads a court into error or by conduct 
approves the error committed by the court, 
cannot later take advantage of such error in 
procedure." 
Later, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 
P. 2d 185 (1954), the court expanded and reaffirmed what 
it had said many times before. The court said in part: 
"Furthermore, it is well established that 
a party cannot assign as error the giving of 
his own requests. H e cannot lead the court 
into error and then be heard to complain there-
of. . . . " 
Decisions from other jurisdictions supporting re-
spondent's position are voluminous. Some recent cases 
in support thereof are: People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 
3d 242, 108 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1973), holding that a party 
is estopped from asserting error on appeal that was in-
duced by his own conduct. "He may not lead a judge 
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into substantial error and then complain of it." (Empha-
sis added.) Mack v. United States, 310 A. 2d 234 (D. C. 
App., 1973), holding that one cannot invite error and 
complain of prejudice; People v. Shackelford, 511 P. 2d 
19 (Colo., 1973), holding that the party who was the 
instrument of injecting error must aibide by the conse-
quences of such errors; People v. Miles, 13 111. App. 3d 
45, 300 N. E. 2d 822 (1972), which held that a defendant 
would not be permitted to argue an alleged error where 
his counsel of record actually invited and affirmatively 
participated in the procedure which he now claimed as 
error. 
In the present case, Mr. Hill conversed with appel-
lant in detail about waiving a jury trial and based on 
these out of court discussions, appellant determined that 
he wanted to waive trial by jury (R. 96). A motion was 
made shortly after the court was called to order. The 
court questioned the appellant as to his desire to waive 
jury trial and the transcript of the trial indicates that the 
appellant had an ample understanding of what was taking 
place. Appellant does not contend otherwise. 
Simply because appellant Kelsey is represented by 
different counsel on appeal does not authorize appellant 
now to reject his own and his former counsel's actions 
and motions before the trial judge. Certainly, the record 
, establishes that the appellant led the trial court into 
allowing the waiver of jury trial. 
In light of the foregoing analysis and authority, as 
well as the dear implications and statements contained 
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in the record, it is respectfully submitted that the appel-
lant Kelsey cannot now claim injury for something he 
himself led the court to do. This is especially significant 
in light of the fact that no prejudice took place since 
the entire history and record of this case contains no 
evidence of such. It is therefore submitted that on this 
ground alone, the contentions of the appellant should 
be rejected. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER WAS A VOLUN-
TARY AND KNOWING WAIVER OF HIS 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, AND TO 
HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT DURING PO-
LICE QUESTIONING. 
The issue presented by the appellant within Pfrint 
III of his brief is whether the evidence sustains that he 
knowing and voluntary waived his rights to remain silent 
and to have counsel present during questioning. 
Appellant's first challenge is premised upon mistake 
and the second upon capacity. Respondent will treat 
these arguments in that order. 
The best evidence as to the voluntariness and fcnow-
ingness of appellant's actions at the time of bis confession 
is derived from an examination of the recorded confession 
(State's Exhibit 20). 
The confession contains ample evidence of efforts 
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by the state to insure the defendant's understanding of 
his Fifth Amendment Rights, as prescribed in Miranda 
v. Arizona, supra. 
(1) Page one (1) of the confession records the fol-
lowing exchange: 
Q. Stewart, you were advised of your rights 
before by Sgt. J O H N S O N . We agin 
want to advise you of your rights. 
You have the right to remain silent. Any-
thing you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law. You have the right 
to talk to a lawyer and have him present 
with you while you are being questioned. 
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one 
will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
Do you understand each of these rights 
I have explained to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Having these rights in mind, do you wish 
to talk to us now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you wish to answer our questions now 
without contacting a lawyer or without 
a lawyer present, you have the right to stop 
answering questions at any time. Do you 
understand each of these rights? 
A. Yes. 
(2) On page seven (7) an effort was again made 
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to insure the voluntary and knowing nature of defen-
dant's admission: 
Q. Do (RH) you have any questions Officer 
C A M P B E L L ? 
A. No, I think that is about it. 
Q. When this statement is typed up, will 
you be willing to sign this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was this statement you have given here 
voluntary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you under any stress or coercion? 
( R H ) 
A. I don't know what coercion is. 
Q. Has anyone forced you to give this? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you under the influence of any drugs ? 
A. Not at this moment. 
Q. Are you under the influence of any liquor 
or alcholic beverages? 
A. Not at this moment. 
Q. After this statement is typed, you will 
be given a copy in addition to the copies 
in which you indicated you would sign. Is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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The transcript supports the full compliance by the 
state with the objective standards of Miranda. Each 
and every indication of defendant's misunderstanding 
of this very explicit "Miranda" warning, as explained by 
the defendant himself (R. 286-289), arose after the ap-
pellant's confession. 
Clearly, the invitation to self-serving confusion and 
exculpatory misunderstanding would prove irresistible if 
this occurrence were to allow defendants to nullify and 
rescind an otherwise sufficient confession merely by 
claiming a subsequent misunderstanding as to the mean-
ing of the warning. The respondent is without knowledge 
of any subsequent Supreme Court decision treating the 
effect, if any, of a subsequent denial of a knowledgeable 
and voluntary confession which was entered after a 
"Miranda" warning where the accused acknowledged his 
understanding of its provisions. 
Various state and lower federal courts have examined 
this issue and have found the ex post facto test of con-
fusion by appellant to be unworkable and fraught with 
the probability of self-serving declarations of mistake. 
In Foster v. State, 304 N. E. 2d 534 (Ind. 1973), that 
court held that a defendant could not claim later, after 
having been given a full "Miranda" warning, that he did 
not understand his right to have counsel present, or that 
counsel would be appointed if he could not afford to re-
tain one. This objective approach to Miranda, is not 
isolated, and was also adopted by the Court in State v. 
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McKnight, 52 N. J. 35, 243 A. 2d 240, 251 (1968), wherein 
the court concluded: 
"Hence if a defendant was given the 
Miranda warnings, if the coercion of custodial 
interrogation was thus dissipated, his 'waiver' 
was no less Voluntary' and 'knowing' and 'in-
telligent' because he misconceived the inculpa-
tory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because 
he thought that what he said could not be used 
because it was oral or because he had his fingers 
crossed, or because he could well have used a 
lawyer." (Emphasis added.) 
In Jones v. State, 252 N. E. 2d 572, 577 (Ind. 1969), 
that court found that a full "Miranda" warning, which 
the defendant acknowledged as understandable at the 
time given, established a prima facie case that a con-
fession entered pursuant to the warning was voluntarily 
and intelligently offered. The burden was then shifted 
to the defendant to prove his error of understanding or 
his incapacity to make a knowing waiver. See also Frazier 
v. United States, 476 F. 2d 891, 898 (D. C. Or. 1971), 
An enlightening article in 52 N. C. L. Rev. 454, at 460 
(Dec. 1973), reviewing the post Miranda cases concluded: 
"An accused can rarely expect to nullify 
or express waiver and confession simply by 
testifying that he misunderstood his rights. . ." 
The article continues, at 462-463, that the police cannot 
be expected to employ a subjective standard to determine 
when a waiver and confession were "really" voluntary, 
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absent some overt and discemable sign which should 
elert them to the defendant's incapacity to understand 
his actions. 
Respondent maintains there was no external show-
ing of record which would indicate defendant's misunder-
standing if in fact it did exist. The defendant's own 
words at trial confirm this finding (R. 291-293). This 
jurisdiction should embrace the majority and objective 
test and reject appellant's belated assertion of misunder-
standing as to his waiver and confession. 
Appellant's second argument relating to this aspect 
of the case is the assertion that he did not have the 
capacity to make a knowing waiver. This subject is 
treated in 69 A. L. R. 2d 348: 
" The law on the question under annotation 
is relatively clear and may be summarized as 
follows: mental subnormality on the paret of 
one confessing to a crime does not of itself de-
prive the confession of voluntariness or for its 
admission in evidence, so long as the subnor-
mality has not deprived the person in question 
of the capacity to understand the meaning and 
effect of the confession." 
This annotation is made applicable to post Miranda 
cases in 69 A. L. R. 2d, Later Case Service (Supp. 1974) 
at 142, which maintains the general rule that some ob-
jective showing of incapacity must be made by the ag-
grieved party for the waiver or confession to be held 
void. In Coney v. State, 491 S. W. 2d 501 (Mo. 1973), 
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the confession of a 16 year old, accused of murder, was 
admissible where, although he was illiterate and of sub-
normal mentality, he was found capable of distinguishing 
between right and wrong and able to understand the 
significance of his criminal act. See also State v. Sisneros, 
79 N. W. 600, 446 P. 2d 875 (1968); Encina v. State, 471 
S. W. 2d 384 (Tex. Crim. 1971. 
Respondent maintains that appellant's assertion as 
to the burden of proof is fundamentally misplaced. A 
close reading of State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 
2d 772 (1969), indicates a prima facie case of voluntary 
waiver is established where defendant was apprised of 
his rights and then waived them. The present record 
does not establish sufficient evidence of defendant's in-
capacity, or of a confession entered under circumstances 
of duress or coercion to regard it as inadmissible. Appel-
lant's statement that the defendant was subnormal is 
wholly conclusionary, (App. Br. P. 23), since Dr. Moench 
in testimony testified that the appellant was in the "nor-
mal" range (R. 465). 
The record supports the conclusion that the defen-
dant had sufficient capacity under the tests dis-
cussed, supra, to enter a voluntary waiver of the rights 
in question and enter his confession of guilt. Dr. Moench, 
the psychiatrist, called upon to examine the defendant 
prior to trial, testified that defendant could distinguish 
right from wrong and was aware of the nalture of his 
actions (R. 459). Defendant testified, though maintain-
ing he misunderstood his right to counsel and silence that 
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he was competent to understand the nature of the 
"Miranda" rights (R. 294). Further, the deputy county 
attorney, Mr. Shepard, who attempted to assist the de-
fendant after the arrest, testified that the defendant was 
both lucid and capable of understanding the nature of 
his actions (R. 307-308). Appellant's assertion that the 
defendant was not capable of entering a voluntary or 
intelligent waiver of his rights must be dismissed as 
without support in the record. 
Respondent would join with appellant in desiring an 
infallible subjective test by which to gauge the actual 
intent and understanding of an accused. This idealistic 
jurisprudence, unfortunately, is not within present vision; 
without malice, therefore, respondent must ask that ap-
pellant's attack upon his voluntary waiver of rights and 
confession be dismissed as without basis in law or fact. 
This conclusion is required by State v. Allen, 29 Utah 
2d 88, 90, 505 P. 2d 302 (1973), where this court con-
cluded: 
"This court will not disturb the finding 
of the trial court a confession was voluntarily 
made in the absence of a showing of an abuse 
of discretion, where there is substantial evi-
dence upon which the trial court could reason-
ably so find." 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED 
THE I N T R O D U C T I O N OF OBJECTS 
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TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S DWELLING 
PLACE. 
In allowing into evidence items taken from appel-
lant's dwelling, the Lower Court premised its action upon 
one of two theories (R. 433): 
(1) The defendant did not have stand-
ing to object to the search since the residence 
was under the exclusive control of Mrs. Her-
ron (the defendant's mother) where she had 
freely and without coercion or duress consented 
to the search; 
(2) The defendant had by silence and 
affirmative acts consented to the search. 
The facts indicate Mrs. Herron had exclusive con-
trol of the dwelling with the defendant being at most a 
tenant at will in her household. With such a relationship, 
a vast majority of courts hold the doctrine of Sterner v. 
California, 376 U. S. 483, 84 S. Ot. 889, 11 L. E. 2d 856 
(1964), as applicable. 
The following excerpts of trial testimony indicate 
that the defendant was living with Mrs. Herron within 
a familial relationship and not as a boarder or tenant. 
This relationship is significant in establishing the ex-
clusive right of Mrs. Herron to allow a search of the 
premises absent objection by the defendant. On this 
point, the record discloses: 
(1) Mrs. Herron had received forty 
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dollars ($40) from her son. All but four 
dollars ($4) of this amount was for payment 
or an antecedent debt (R. 419). 
(2) The defendant shared the room with 
other relations and did not exercise exclusive 
use. Further, there was no petition to define 
defendant's living area, nor did defendant have 
a key (R. 420). 
In State v. Schott, 182 N. W. 2d 878, 880 (Minn. 
1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded a mother 
had exclusive dominion of a residence. A resultant right 
to permit a warrantless search of her son's room existed 
even when there was not a landlord tenant relationship 
between the mother and son established through the 
payment of consideration and where the exclusive use 
of a room or area was acknowledged. The decision, at 
879 footnote (1), indicates the right of a parent to allow 
a search of the area in which a child resides to be the 
majority rule. 
The Maryland Court in Jones v. State, 13 Md. App. 
309, 283 A. 2d 184, 186 (1972), further supports the con-
tention that a defendant's parent may consent to the 
search of a room or area used by the defendant when 
there was not a tenancy relationship. The cases in 31 
A. L. R. 2d 1081-1083 also support the conclusion, in the 
instant case, that Mrs. Herron had the sale and exclusive 
right to grant or deny a search of her residence. 
There remains for consideration the issue of consent 
by Mrs. Herron to the search. The transcript of trial 
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establishes that Mrs. Herron allowed the police to enter 
and search the premises only after they had requested 
to do so (R. 173-174). The record further discloses that 
she had acceded to the requests voluntarily, motivated 
by her desire to be " . . . a law-abiding citizen" and, with 
clear knowledge that she could refuse any such request 
for entrance, (R. 187). Against this factual setting, the 
assertion that Mrs. Herron was coerced or acted under 
duress in allowing the police to search her residence takes 
on an air of whimsical speculation. 
Even absent the aforementioned facts, there is not 
affirmative duty, under the Fourth Amendment, to in-
form those having ownership or control of a premise of 
their right to deny such searches, or to elicit from them 
a knowing waiver to such searches. The Supreme Court 
has determined in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 
that knowledge of a right to refuse entry is not a pre-
requisite of voluntary consent. 
As to the second argument discussed by the trial 
court, respondent does not believe the defendant, within 
the facts of this case, possessed an independent right 
of refusal to deny the search of his mother's residence. 
The record, however, indicates defendant not only did 
not object, but tendered a voluntary acquiescence to the 
search by becoming an active participant (R. 272). 
The instant case appears to parallel this court's 
holding in State v. Lopez, supra, where a voluntary ad-
mission, leading to a search, which was not objected to, 
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was held to constitute a binding consent to the search 
under the Fourth Amendment requirements. 
Again, it is not a constitutional requirement under 
the Schneckloth decision, supra, to look beyond apparent 
facts to determine if defendant knew or was fully ap-
praised of his rights before a search of the residence could 
be allowed. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT FULFILLED ALL REQUI-
SITES OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DE-
GREE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-2 attempts to define "malice" 
as follows: 
"Such malice may be express or implied. 
I t is express when there is manifested a deli-
berate intention unlawfully to take the life of a 
fellow creature. I t is implied when no consider-
able provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandon-
ed and malignant heart." 
Here attempts are made to distinguish some levels 
of intent and/or action so as to positulate the exact crime 
committed. Respondent feeds that appellant's brief is 
full of innuendos supporting the position that without 
actual defined pre thought-out intent, the requirement 
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of malice is not fulfilled and no finding of murder can 
be made. This court has not given such a broad and 
sweeping interpretation to the law of this state. 
It is presented by the respondent, that even the 
diminished capacity of the appellant does not do away 
with the fulfillment of the malice requirement when 
taken into account with the entire record. This court 
has emphasized that to be guilty of second degree murder 
does not require an explicit intent to kill. In State v. 
Matteri, 119 Utah 143, 225 P. 2d 325 (1950), this court 
upheld the first degree murder conviction of the appel-
lant even though the trial court had failed to instruct 
the jury on the possibility of second degree murder when 
there existed an intent to kill. The court said: 
"Eliminated from the case entirely, so far 
as second degree murder is concerned, is the 
possibility of second degree murder where there 
exists an intent to kill. While intent to kill is 
not a necessary requisite to second degree mur-
der, it may be an important element if there is 
absent other elements to raise the killing to first 
degree murder" (Emphasis added.) 
Though the court continued by discussing the aspects 
of intent, malice aforethought and premeditation, the 
court did squarely indicate that sufficient evidence could 
exist without proving "intent to kill" which would be 
sufficient for a finding of murder in the second degree. 
Appellant's statement that the defendant acted solely 
out of fear (Appellant's brief, P. 28) is conclusionary in 
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the sense that though Dr. Moench testified that it was 
his opinion that such was the case, the defendant also 
knew that it was not right to strike or make an injured 
child walk (R. 458) and defendant knew that striking 
an injured child could kill that child (R. 459). Dr. 
Moench's entire testimony is filled with such conflicts 
such as: The appellant knew what was right and wrong 
but didn't have intent to hurt; or the defendant was not 
insane at the time of the incident but couldn't control 
his acts. It is therefore up to the trier of fact to deter-
mine from all evidence whether the defendant knew that 
hitting the child would cause injury. If so, then suffi-
cient intent and malice does exist to warrant the court's 
finding of murder in the second degree. 
It is not prejudicial for the court to find the state 
not upholding its burden of proof regarding the premedi-
tated first degree murder, but to find murder in the sec-
ond degree. The appellant contends such error and cites 
State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), in 
support thereof. Russell, as well as State v. Thompson, 
110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946), merely stand for 
the proposition that intent to kill may be, but is not re-
quired to be, an element of second degree murder. In 
Russell, the prejudicial error resulted from the trial court's 
instruction that the defendant had to have the specific 
intent to kill in order to commit second degree murder 
(106 Utah at 131-2). Thus, Russell is clearly distinguish-
able from the instant case. In Thompson, the prejudicial 
error resulted from the trial court's failure to instruct 
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the jury that a necessary element of first degree murder, 
on the theory of a killing perpetrated by an act greatly 
dangerous to others' lives evidencing a depraved mind 
regardless of human life, was a planned and intentional 
shooting (110 Utah at 129, 170 at 161). Thus, Thompson, 
too, is entirely different from the instant case. 
The appellant relies heavily on the testimony of Dr. 
Moench. Many of his statements as indicated above are 
not totally in harmony with the innocence of the appel-
lant for reasons of diminished capacity. Dr. Moench did 
testify that an intense emotional buildup took place 
within the defendant before the day in question as a 
result of an argument with the defendant's stepfather 
(R. 454). "The defendant reported that he was extremely 
angry at this time, was almost ready to kill the step-
father" (R. 454). 
It cannot be substantially disproved from the record 
that the defendant did not know his actions could lead 
to harm and possibly murder if a release was found for 
this buildup. 
The court found that even with this impulse to 
gratify his anxieties, sufficient capacity existed on the 
part of the defendant to realize the effects of what was 
taking place. Simply because there was no direct proof 
that the appellant "lied in wait" or meticulously planned 
the murder of the victim does not show that murder did 
not take place in compliance with the definition of the 
Code. In fact, the court did so find that the pre-medita-
tion required for first degree murder was not proven, 
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but that sufficient evidence existed to make reasonable 
men conclude that even with diminished capacity, the 
defendant knew or should have known that serious bodily 
injury would happen if the young child was hit. 
Though the appellant places great emphasis on State 
v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 251, 214 P. 2d 626 (1950), the re-
spondent indicates that that holding was modified by 
Matteri, supra, in that specific beforehand intent to kill 
is not a necessity for the conviction of murder in the 
second degree. The respondent therefore submits that 
there was sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant 
was guilty of murder in the second degree. 
POINT VI. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
Appellant attempts to create a "void" of evidence 
relating to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Such contentions in themselves have no merit when the 
entire record is viewed and total testimony of all con-
cerned is studied. Thus, the respondent submits the fol-
lowing in support of its position that the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law are supported by sufficient 
evidence. 
Finding of Fact number three relating to the intent 
to cause bodily harm or that the defendant should have 
known that such would take place, was testified to ex-
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tensively by Dr. Moench. Not only did Dr. Moench state 
his opinion (which can or cannot be considered "the right 
answer" by the trier of fact) that the actions of the de-
fendant were impulsive, but he also stated that the ap-
pellant was emotionally keyed up from a previous day, 
that "there was nothing in my examination that indicated 
there was any intent to harm the child until after the 
event got underway9' (R. 455), (Emphasis added) th^t 
the child's acts made the defendant lash out, and that 
the defendant knew right and wrong and knew the con-
sequences of his acts (R. 458). The defendant was legally 
and medically sane at the time of the incident and he 
knew that striking an injured child could kill that child 
(R. 459). The opinion of Dr. Moench further contained 
the statement that the defendant knew hitting in the 
stomach injures (R. 467). 
Certainly, these statements by Dr. Moench which 
also support the finding of diminished capacity show that 
the defendant did have faculties available for which the 
judge could find malice. Not only these statements, but 
the confession of the defendant himself (State's exhibit 
20) indicates clearly that he should have known injuries 
existed after having hit the victim. When the appellant 
saw a bump on the head of the victim he said: "I really 
got worried then" (State's exhibit 20, p. 6), realizing 
that something serious was wrong, yet he continued to 
hit the victim. It was not erroneous for the court to find 
as fact that the defendant knew or should have known 
the consequences of his acts. 
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From the testimony deduced above and that which 
relates to the points in issue, Conclusions of Law two 
and three are supported by findings of fact. Appellant 
makes it appear that without certain desires or intents 
to kill, malice aforethought cannot be established. Respon-
dent contends that this might be true of only one or two 
blows were struck, but not only did it cease to stop with 
that, but belts, spray bottles, and sheer force were used 
in a most atrocious way to cause harm. Evidence in-
deed supports the finding that the appellant should have 
known the consequences of his acts. Therefore, it is a 
logical conclusion based on those findings that malice did 
in fact exist in support of the court's finding of murder 
in the second degree. No inconsistency appears and cer-
tainly the trier of fact did not usurp any unwarranted 
authority to make the findings and conclusions it did. 
In the closing language of the Tenth Circuit in Wil-
liams v. United States, 267 F. 2d 559 (10th Cir. 1959), 
cited by the appellant the court said: 
"In other words, the court in effect found 
the issues of fact against appellant; and the 
crucial findings have adequate support in the 
record and are not clearly erroneous. There-
fore, they must not be disturbed on appeal." 
Though this case is clearly distinguishable on facts 
alone, the application of the above language says that 
unless the findings are "clearly erroneous" they will not 
be disturbed on appeal. 
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The respondent has reviewed the entire transcript 
and record with particularity and finds "no clearly erron-
eous" findings in the entire matter. Respondent there-
fore prays this Court to so find and deny any request 
for acquittal or new trial. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL IN THIS ACTION WAS COM-
PLETE AND WITHOUT ERROR EVEN 
THOUGH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW WERE ENTERED BY 
A JUDGE OTHER THAN HE WHO HEARD 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's final argument on appeal is a bootstrap-
ping attempt to get this court to act in opposition to the 
fair processes of trial. This argument is therefore non-
meritous and should be rejected as having no substan-
tial basis for either acquitted or reversal. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says 
in part: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The language emphasized above does not require that 
said findings of fact or conclusions of law be in writing 
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or of a formal nature — only that they be made in some 
form of clarity. The judgment is required to be entered. 
The respondent submits that this test or requirement 
was met at the close of trial when Judge Wilkins found 
the appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. The 
court said: 
" T H E COURT: . . .The parties having 
rested and submitted final argument, this is my 
ruling: I find that the defendant, Stewart 
Michael Kelsey, is guilty of the crime of 
murder in the second degree. The testimony of 
two of Utah's most distinguished medical doc-
tors, one a psychiatrist, and one a forensic path-
ologist, coupled with other corroborating testi-
mony, demonstrated that the defendant had a 
diminished ability to control himself in the com-
mission of this crime, and, therefore, the ele-
ments of murder in the first degree beyond 
those requisite for murder in the second degree 
were not proved by the state beyond a reason-
able doubt. I do find, however, that the state 
has proved each and every element of the crime 
of murder in the second degree beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." (R. 526-527). 
Contained herein is each and every fact and conclusion 
of law upon which the formal findings were made. From 
the fact that the appellant had a diminished capacity to 
control his impulses to the rejections of premeditaftion 
necessary for first degree murder, the court made certain 
that all understood that the appellant Stewart Michael 
Kelsey had done everything required to be convicted of 
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murder in the second degree. This, of course, includes 
the fact that he was the one causing injury, he did so 
knowing the consequence of his acts, and that said beat-
ing was intentionally done with malice aforethought. 
This court has not resolved all conflicts or possible 
situations which could arise under Rule 52 and Rule 63 
and as such it seems consistent with justice and fairness 
to interpret the language of said rule to include this 
"spirit" of the law, and not rely solely on the formal 
requite of written and signed findings. 
As far as appellant trying to bootstrap it must be 
noted that a final judgment and sentence were pro-
nounced and signed by Judge Wilkins on whether formal 
findings of fact and conclusions of law should be made 
and entered. Three months passed from the time the 
court found defendant guilty of murder in the second 
degree (R. 527) until said motion was made (R. 532). 
Thus, the request for formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law did not go to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant, but solely for written findings to allow 
preparation for appeal or other nonconbrolling reasons. 
The appellant cites Makah Indian Tribe v. Moore, 
93 F. Supp. 105 (D. C. Wash., 1950), in support of his 
argument that findings of fact and conclusions of law 
should not be signed by a subsequent judge. The case 
at bar is distinguishable and the facts presented add 
different insight into the case than what appellant as-
serts. 
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Makah involved the interpretation of F. R. C. P. 63 
which is essentially the same as Utah's present Rule 63. 
Therein a judge who heard the case died before either 
the findings were made or judgment signed. This judge 
did, however, give oral findings and conclusions although 
they were not so labelled or separable. The court said, 
however: 
"From the foregoing it is apparent that 
the opinion of Judge Black is sufficient to 
stand for formal findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law if it indicates "the factual basis 
for the ultimate conclusion" and if it "pro-
vides a clear understanding of the basis of the 
decision." 
The court found that because sufficient reason was given 
for the findings made, a subsequent judge according to 
Rule 63 had the power to sign the judgment. The court 
added a matter of dictum by saying: 
"I t is unnecessary that I also sign the sub-
mitted findings and conclusions. In fact it 
would be improper for me to do so as Judge 
Black was the one who heard the evidence and 
saw the witnesses and the exhibits. I t was his 
decision." 
Thus, this case did not stand solely for what the 
appellant purports, but for the fact that what was said 
from the bench was sufficient to allow a subsequent judge 
to sign the judgment. 
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In the case at bar the judgment was signed and the 
defendant ordered to prison. The mere signing of find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law is not paramount and 
in no way affects the guilt or innocence of the appellant 
and is not prejudicial to his position. 
If the court so finds that this was error, it certainly 
would be classified as harmless error. Rule 61 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
"No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in 
any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the sustantial rights of the 
parties" (Emphasis added.) 
Certainly, the appellant has failed to show or even at-
tempt to show why or how the failure of signing the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law is prejudicial of 
his substantial rights. Appeal was not made until alter 
said findings were entered, well over a year after the 
conclusion of trial. This is indeed much more than the 
allotted thirty days for appeal. This can't be prejudicial 
against the defendant, it was in his favor. 
The respondent therefore submits tha£ Rule 52 and 
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63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be construed 
liberally to include those circumstances not yet known. 
The appellant requests a strict and narrow interpretation 
of the Rules. Simply because Rule 63 states that another 
judge may perform court duties "after a verdict is re-
turned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
filed . . ." does not and should not mean that after judg-
ment has been signed and entered, another judge cannot 
make such findings when in itself the motion for formal 
findings was signed. No prejudice took place, and if this 
court considers this omission error, such error was harm-
less. The Court should therefore reject this contention 
of the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the case at bar 
and based on the discussion presented in respondent's 
arguments above, the respondent submits to this Court 
that the trial court was correct in its finding of guilt, 
the appellant had the right to waive the jury, and that 
no grounds exist which warrant a reversal or granting of 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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